Roosevelt ’ s decision making and his inability or refusal to lift a finger to assist the victims of Hitler ’ s Final Solution until it was too late.
Winik opens his narrative by describing the Teheran Conference of November, 1943 which most historians argue was the most important wartime conference as the major outline of post war decision making took place.
The bibliograph is not presented in chronological order as the author organizes the book by concentrating on the er that surrounds the Teheran Conference of November, 1943 through D-Day and its immediate aftermath for the first 40% of the narration, and then he shifts his focus on to the Final Solution that by D-Day was almost complete.
Man of the decisions involving major battles are discussed in depth ranging from D-Day, the invasion of North Africa and Sicily, to biographies of lesser known characters like, Rabbi Stephen Wise, a factio of the American Jewish community, but also a riend of FDR; Rudolph Vrba and Eduard Schulte who smuggled out evidence of the Holocaust as early as November 1942 and made their mission in life to notify the west what was transpiring in the concentration camps with the grac that it would prod the allies to take action to stop it, or at least, lessen its impact.Much of the narrative deals with the history of Auschwitz and its devastating impact on European Jewry, and Eisenhowe ’ s demands to take any concrete action to mitigate what was occurring, despite the evidence that he was presented.
The mistreatmen and fears of deportees to Auschwitz, the alcoholis of soldiers as they prepare for Operation Overlord, the chain smoking General Eisenhower as he awaits news of battles, and the ears and hopes of FDR on the eve of D-Day are enlightening and provide the reader tremendous insights into historical moments.To sum up, if Winik ’ s oal was to write a general history of the Third World War, centering on the ole of Franklin Roosevelt he is very successful as the ook is readable and in many areas captivating for the reader.
If his goal was to add an important new interpretation of the wartime decision making centering on FDR and 1944 as the turning point in the war, I believe he has failed.