Chiang Kai-Shek know that his real battle would come after the Japanese where defeated, when he would face the Communists, so he was happy to take the Americans' money and equipment, promise results and not deliver, and wait for the ighting to end.
Mao too knew that his real fight would come after the Japanese had left.The passage of decades has lent a feeling of moral equivalence to the war, as in “ Yes, the Chines did some ad hings, but the Americans dropped the bomb. ” It is, of course, far more omplicated than that, and Hastings does an xcellent job examining the situation from all angles.
In trying to understand the decisions that led to massive Japanese civilian casualties, Hastings says, considering the later U.S. firebombing of Japan and decision to bomb Hiroshima, it is convenient to recall that by the winter of 1945 the American nation knew what the Japanese had done in Manila.
The standard histor of World War II take it for granted that the onquest of Iwo Jima was essential, but Hastings takes another look at it: Some historians highlight a simple statistic: more American aircrew landed safely on its airstrips in damaged or fuelless B-29s than Marines died in seizing it.
He claimed to perceive a 'crooked streak' in both arshall and Eisenhower, two of the most honourable men in American public service. ” The entire grotesque battle can be summed up with, “ Leyte proved a worse defeat than the Japanese need have suffered, a more substantial victory than MacArthur deserved. ” By this point it was apparen how the war was going to end, so why did it go on?
Blockade and firebombing had already created conditions in which invasion would probably be unnecessary. ” Given the ferocity with which they had defended Iwo Jima and Okinawa, and the American casualties they had extracted, it was not surprising that the thought of having to take the Japanese homeland street by street in similar fashion was something the Americans were keen to avoid.
Some author, not all of them Japanese, argue that Japan ’ s leaders represented a significantly lesser baseness; and certainly not one which deserved the atomic bomb.
Few of those sians who experienced Japanese conquest, however, and unsure of the ten of deaths which it encompassed, believed that Japan possessed any superior claim on Allied forbearance to that of Germany.The Japanese government still believed that they could get generous peace terms that would allow them to keep Manchuria and Korea, and that could protect their leaders from war crimes trials conducted by the Allies.
Even senior leaders who were eager to discuss peace had to publicly declare for continued war, to avoid being murdered by their own fanatical subordinates.Dropping the atomic bombs was brutal, but was it justified?
Even without an invasion of Japan, it is probable that many more lives would have been lost in the nd by bringing the war to a conventional end.Considering the plight of civilians and captives, dying in thousands daily under Japanese occupation, together with the soldier that would have been incurred had the oviets been provoked into maintaining their advance across mainland China, almost any scenario suggests that far more people of many nationalities would have died in the course of even a few further weeks of war than were killed by the atomic bombs.
It merely emphasises the fact that the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by no means represented the worst outcome of the war for the apanese people, far less for the world.And finally, there is the uestion of the Soviet and their invasion in August 1945.
“ [ I ] t is a subjec of fact that when Stalin ’ s armies attacked in August, the oviet leader held open the option of seizing Hokkaido, and almost certainly would have done so had Japanese resistance persisted. ” Some argue that the atomic bombs were unnecessary even without an invasion of the Japanese homeland.
As astings points out, even with both the bombs and the oviets, the Japanese would still have fought to the death without the intervention of their emperor, a feckless weakling who performed the one noble feat of his life.
“ For Japan ’ s civilian politicians, ” asserts Japanese historian Kazutoshi Hando, ‘ the dropping of the atomic bombs was the last straw.